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Abstract—We introduce randomized Limited View (LV) ad-
versary codes that provide protection against an adversary that
uses their partial view of the communication to construct an
adversarial error vector to be added to the channel. For a
codeword of length N , the adversary selects a subset of ρrN of the
codeword components to “see”, and then “adds” an adversarial
error vector of weight ρwN to the codeword. Performance of
the code is measured by the probability of the decoder failure
in recovering the sent message. An (N, qRN , δ)-limited view
adversary code ensures that the success chance of the adversary
in making decoder fail, is bounded by δ when the information
rate of the code is at least R. Our main motivation to study these
codes is providing protection for wireless communication at the
physical layer of networks.
We formalize the definition of adversarial error and decoder
failure, construct a code with efficient encoding and decoding that
allows the adversary to, depending on the code rate, read up to
half of the sent codeword and add error on the same coordinates.
The code is non-linear, has an efficient decoding algorithm, and
is constructed using a message authentication code (MAC) and a
Folded Reed-Solomon (FRS) code. The decoding algorithm uses an
innovative approach that combines the list decoding algorithm of
the FRS codes and the MAC verification algorithm to eliminate the
exponential size of the list output from the decoding algorithm. We
discuss application of our results to Reliable Message Transmission
problem, and open problems for future work.
I. INTRODUCTION
Shannon [18] formalized the study of reliable communi-
cation over noisy channels where transmitted symbols are
changed according to a known fixed probability distribution.
In adversarial channels corruption of transmitted symbols is
adversarial: the adversary can corrupt any subset of the symbols
as long as the size of the set is bounded and is a constant
fraction of the transmitted sequence. Much less is known about
adversarial channels. For example, although it is well known
that the information capacity of a binary symmetric channel
with crossover probability ρ is 1−H(ρ), the answer to the same
question in the case of binary adversarial channels where the
adversary corrupts a ρ fraction of bits in unknown, although it is
known that it is much less than 1−H(ρ). Adversarial channels
have received much attention in recent years [8][12][13] as
they provide a powerful method of modelling communication
channels where the channel behaviour is not known or varies
over time.
In adversarial channels, one commonly assumes that the sent
codeword is known, or even chosen (for example in randomized
codes) by the adversary and that the adversary is allowed to
corrupt a fraction of the sent symbols. For unique decoding the
number of errors must be less than half the minimum distance
of the code, and for higher fraction of errors, one needs to make
extra assumptions such as a secret key shared by the sender and
receiver in private codes [12], or bound on the computation of
the adversary [14].
In this paper we consider an adversary with unlimited
computation but assume that the adversary has a limited view of
the transmitted codeword. That is we assume the adversary can
see only a fraction of the sent codeword and can add errors to
a fraction, possibly different, of the codeword. In other words
the adversarial capability is specified by a pair of parameters
(ρr, ρw), meaning that the adversary can read ρrN components
of their choice, and corrupt ρwN components of their choice.
We do not assume any shared secret key.
A. Motivations
One of the motivations of our work is to model an on-
line adversary in a wireless communication system, where
the adversary can partially observe the communicated symbols
before tampering with them [15].
We assume the encoded message is a q-ary vector and that
the adversary can choose the positions that he would like to
“see” (the remaining positions are not visible to the adversary)
and then designs the tampering vector (noise) that is “added” to
the encoded message. Our definition of limited view adversary
codes aims to guarantee reliable authentic communication at
the physical layer of communication channels and this means
that the decoder will never output an incorrect (un-authentic)
message, and with a very small probability fails to output
the correct message. A somewhat similar scenario is has been
considered in Algebraic Manipulation Detection Codes (AMD)
[3] where the encoded message is stored in a secure storage and
the adversary can only “add” errors to the codeword. In AMD
codes the adversary cannot “see” the stored codeword and the
aim of the code is to detect tampering with the message. We
allow some partial information to be “leaked” to the adversary
and the goal of the coding is to correctly recover the message.
Note that because the code is randomized, recovering the
message does not imply that the added noise can be found.
A second motivation for our model is to study 1-round
δ-Reliable Message Transmission (RMT) [5] as a code and
so establish the relationship between two seemingly different
areas of communication over networks, and communication
over noisy channels. Such relationship can enrich the tools
and techniques developed in each area and result in better
understanding and constructions in the two cases. In RMT
scenario a sender is connected to a receiver through a set of
N node disjoint communication paths, a subset of which is
controlled by an adversary who can see what is sent on a
controlled path and can replace it with a value of their choosing.
Communication paths in RMT scenario are assumed end to end
and unlike network coding [1], nodes in the network do not take
part in the communication protocol. In RMT the information
processing is by the legitimate users (encoding and decoding)
and happens at the ends of a path. The adversary interacts with
the system by reading a subset of paths and changing the value
sent over another subset of paths. When the two subsets are
the same, the modification can be represented as adding an
error vector. δ-RMT protocols in general are multi-round and
guarantee that message is correctly received with a probability
at least 1−δ. The bulk of research on δ-RMT protocol assumes
the adversary reads and modifies the same subset of paths.
B. Our work
We define and formalize randomized (stochastic) limited
view adversary codes, with security against an adversary who
can choose a fraction of positions of codeword to read and then
add errors. For codewords of length N , a (ρr, ρw) adversary
selects a subset of ρrN components to see, and then adds
(component-wise addition over Fq) an error vector of weight
ρwN to the codeword. The decoder outputs either the correct
message or a symbol ⊥, that shows the decoder failure. Perfor-
mance of a code is measured by the probability of the decoder
outputting ⊥; this is the success probability of the adversary
in making the decoder fail. An (N,M, δ)-LV adversary code
guarantees that the message can be correctly recovered against
a (ρr, ρw) adversary, and the success chance of the adversary
in making the decoder to fail is upper-bounded by δ. The
information rate of a code of length N with M codewords is
logqM
N
. A good code will have high information rate for high
values of ρr and ρw.
We construct an (N,M, δ)-LV adversary code that is non-
linear, and uses two building blocks: a message authentication
code and a Folded Reed-Solomon (FRS) code. To encode a
message m, the sender first chooses N appropriately con-
structed secret keys, uses the keys to construct N authen-
tication tags for the message using the chosen MAC (See
MAC Construction II for details), and appends the tags to
the message. The tagged message is then encoded using an
FRS code. The ith component of the final codeword which is
sent to the receiver consists of the corresponding component
of the FRS code and the MAC key. The decoder recovers the
correct message in a conceptually two step process: using the
list decoding algorithm of the FRS code to construct a list of
possible codewords and then applying the MAC verification
algorithm to output either the correct message, or ⊥. This
two step algorithm however can result in an exponential cost
decoding because the output list of the FRS decoding algorithm
can be of exponential size. A previous application of the general
approach of using MACs and FRS codes for the construction
of 1-round RMT [16] has this shortcoming. The innovation in
this paper is to combine the system of linear equations resulting
from the algebraic list decoding algorithm [9] of FRS codes,
with a set of linear equations resulting from the verification
algorithm of a specially constructed MAC, to have a single
system of linear equation whose solution gives the correct
message with a high probability. The MAC in this construction
must be a key efficient MAC that can be used for different
length messages and have appropriate verification algorithm
suitable for efficient decoding. MAC Construction II satisfies
these properties and could be of independent interest. The final
decoder complexity is polynomial.
The code allows the adversary to, depending on the code
rate, read up to half of the codeword and adds error on the
same number of coordinates.
RMT Construction: One of the motivations for defining LV
adversary codes is to cast the 1-round δ-RMT construction as a
coding problem. Our construction of LV adversary code can be
immediately used to give an optimal 1-round δ-RMT construc-
tion (See Section II-B for definitions.) whose parameters match
the best known RMT constructions [16]. It is interesting to note
that the LV adversary code parameters provide a more refined
set of parameters for the evaluation of RMT. In particular, a
1-round δ-RMT is optimal if transmission rate is O(1). Noting
that transmission rate in RMT is the inverse of the information
rate (See Section II-B) in LV adversary codes, any LV adversary
code with non-zero information rate immediately results in
an optimal 1-round δ-RMT. For LV adversary codes however
the rate of information communication is a key efficiency
parameter and the goal is to maximize this rate (with other
parameters fixed). LV adversary code view of 1-round δ-
RMT allows comparison of optimal systems in terms of their
information rate. In addition to providing efficient decoding,
the LV adversary code construction in this paper allows the
parameters of the 1-round δ-RMT code to be chosen such that
the protocol achieves maximum information rate.
LV adversarial channels and codes open many new open
questions. Finding general bounds and relationship among
the information rate R, observation and corruption ratios, ρr
and ρw respectively, and finding the highest information rate
(capacity) of LV adversary codes remain important research
questions. Also construction of good codes by refining our
approach here (combining message authentications codes and
list decodable codes), or using new approaches, are interesting
open problems.
C. Related work
In a previous submission [17] we introduced deterministic
LV adversary codes and gave a deterministic construction of
such codes. Deterministic encoding enforces restrictions on
ρr and ρw, that can be overcome by the randomized codes.
The definition of decoder error in this paper follows the same
approach as deterministic codes, but is in terms of probabilities
instead of the combinatorics of the code. This is needed because
of the randomize nature of the code removes restrictions that
are dictated by the deterministic (one message, one codeword)
nature of the code. In the same submission we also showed
how to adapt a 1-round RMT protocol in [16] to construct
a randomized construction for limited view codes. Decoding
complexity of this construction was exponential and no security
model and proof was provided for the code.
Protection against message manipulation was first considered
in [2] and later formalized as message authentication codes
in [19]. As noted earlier message authentication codes require
shared secret key and provide protection against a powerful
adversary who can completely replace a sent coded message
with another one. The security guarantee for these codes is
detection of manipulation.
Adversarial tampering by an adversary that does not “see”
the encoded message, has been considered in [3]. AMD codes
do not need a secret key but tampering is only by adding an
adversarial noise. LV adversary codes do not require shared
secret and aim at recovering the message. They limit manipu-
lation to adding the nose but allow adversary to partially see
the codeword before designing their adversarial noise vector.
Adversarial channels have been widely studied in the liter-
ature [4], [11]. Our model of adversarial channel has similar-
ity with the model in [13] where binary oblivious channels
are introduced. In oblivious channels the adversary sees the
codeword, and depending on the level of obliviousness, can
use one of the limited number of distributions on the error
vectors that are available to them. A γ-oblivious adversary
can emply at most 21−γ error distributions for corrupting the
codewords. In these codes each codeword is associated with
one error distributions. By limiting the adversary’s reading
capability, our limited view adversary also effectively limits
the number of distributions that the adversary can use. However
each codeword can have more than one error distributions.
Organization.
In Section 2, we give the background for Folded Reed-
Solomon code, 1-round δ-RMT codes and message authentica-
tion codes. In Section 3, we introduce the randomized limited
view adversary code and give new constructions for MAC. In
Section 4, we present an efficient construction for randomized
limited view adversary code. Section 5 discusses our results,
open problems and future works.
II. BACKGROUND
We give an overview of the main building blocks and
definitions required in this paper.
A. Folded Reed-Solomon code
Error correcting codes are used for reliable data transmission
over noisy channels. Let the message space be a set M with
probability distribution Pr(m).
Definition 1: An [N, qRN ] error correcting code C with
information rate R, is a set of qRN code vectors C =
{c1, · · · , cqRN } where ci ∈ FNq . The code has two algorithms:
an encoding and a decoding algorithm. The encoding algorithm
Enc : M → C maps a message from M to a codeword in
C that is sent over the channel. The decoding algorithm Dec :
FNq → M ∪ {⊥} is a deterministic algorithm that takes any
vector in FNq and outputs a message in M or fails, outputting
a symbol ⊥. A decoder error occurs if Dec(Enc(m, r)) 6= m.
The Hamming weight of a vector e ∈ FNq is denoted by
wt(e) and is the number of non-zero components of e. For a
vector y ∈ FNq and an integer r, let B(y, r) be the Hamming
ball of radius r centred at y. Let ρ denote the fraction of errors
(the number of errors divided by the length of the codeword)
that can be corrected by the decoder.
Definition 2: A Bounded Distance Decoding (BDD) algo-
rithm Dec(y) takes a received word y = (y1, · · · , yN ) and
outputs m ∈M if m is the unique message of the codeword(s)
that are at distance at most wt(e) from y. The decoder outputs
⊥ otherwise.
For deterministic codes, the above definition implies that
the decoder outputs m, if Enc(m) is the only codeword in
B(y, wt(e)). In randomized codes however, B(y, wt(e)) may
contain more than one encoding of m.
Using bounded distance decoding, the receiver R outputs
either a message m or the fail symbol ⊥, that is Dec(y) ∈
{M,⊥}.
The above decoding is a unique decoding algorithm and
requires that the output is a single message, or the fail symbol.
For this decoding, correct decoding can be guaranteed if ρ is
less than half of the minimum distance of the code, that is
ρ ≤ 1−R2 . Reed-Solomon code has an efficient unique decoding
algorithm that can correct at most a fraction ρ = 1−R2 errors.
Definition 3: An (N, k) Reed-Solomon code with block
length N(< q) and dimension k over field Fq , is a linear code
with encoding and decoding described below. A message block
of length k defines a polynomial f(x) of degree at most k− 1
over Fq . The codeword corresponding to this message block is
the vector obtained by the evaluation of this polynomial at N
distinct values α1, · · · , αN , where αi ∈ Fq, i = 1 · · ·N . That
is the codeword is (f(α1), · · · , f(αN )).
For higher error ratios, one can use list decoding [6] where
the decoder outputs a list of possible codewords (messages).
Definition 4: Let (N, qRN ) code to be a code with length N
and information rate R. A code C is (ρ, L)-list decodable if the
number of codewords within distance ρN of any received word
is at most L. That is for every word y ∈ qN , there are at most L
codewords at distance ρN or less from y. List decodable codes
can potentially correct up to 1 − R fraction of errors. This is
twice that of unique decoding and is called the list decoding
capacity of the code.
Construction of good codes with efficient list decoding
algorithms is an important research question. An explicit con-
struction of list decodable code that achieves the list decoding
capacity ρ = 1−R− ε is given by Guruswami et al. [9]. The
code is called Folded Reed-Solomon codes (FRS codes) and has
polynomial time encoding and decoding algorithms.
Definition 5: A u1-folded Reed-Solomon code is a code
with block length N = n/u1 over Fu1q with |Fq| > n. We
represent the message by a polynomial f(x) of degree at most
k over Fq , The FRS codeword is over Fu1q and each of its com-
ponent is a u1-tuple (f(γju1 ), f(γju1+1), · · · , f(γju1+u1−1)),
for 0 ≤ j < N , where γ is a generator of F ∗q . In other words
a codeword of a u1-folded Reed Solomon code of length N
is in one-to-one correspondence with a codeword c of a Reed
Solomon code of length u1N , and is obtained by grouping
together u1consecutive components of c.

f(1) f(γu1) · · · f(γu1(N−1))
f(γ) f(γu1+1) · · · f(γu1(N−1)+1)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
f(γu1−1) f(γ2u1−1) · · · f(γu1N−1)

 (1)
We denote the encoding algorithm of FRS code by EncFRS .
u1 is called the folding parameter of the FRS code.
There are a number of efficient list decoding algorithms for
FRS codes. We will use the linear algebraic FRS decoding
algorithm [9]. The algorithm reduces the list decoding problem
of the code to solving a set of linear equations. This algorithm,
although not the best in terms of the number of corrected
errors, but asymptotically achieves the list decoding capacity.
The structure of the decoding algorithm of the FRS code
makes it possible to combine it with the new MAC verification
algorithm, to obtain an efficient decoding algorithm for the
LV adversary code. The following Theorem gives the decoding
capability of linear algebraic FRS code.
Lemma 1: [9] For the Folded Reed-Solomon code of block
length N and rate R = k
u1N
, the following holds for all
integers 1 ≤ v ≤ u1. Given a received word y ∈ (Fu1q )N , in
O((Nu1 log q)
2) time, one can find a basis for a subspace of
dimension at most v− 1 that contains all message polynomials
f ∈ Fq[X ] of degree less than k whose FRS encoding agree
with y in at least a fraction,
N − ρN > N( 1
v + 1
+
v
v + 1
u1R
u1 − v + 1)
of N codeword positions. The algorithm outputs a list of size
at most qv−1.
The decoding algorithm of FRS code is in appendix A.
B. Reliable Message Transmission
In a 1-round δ-RMT problem, the sender S and the receiver
R are connected by N node disjoint paths. The goal is to enable
S to send a message m, drawn from message space M to R
such that R receives the message reliably. The adversary A
has unlimited computational power and in threshold RMT, can
corrupt any subset of at most t out of the N paths which is
unknown to S and R: the adversary can eavesdrop, block or
modify communication that is sent over the corrupted wires. S
uses the encoding algorithm of the RMT protocol to encode
the message m into transcript that is sent to R. The transcript
may be corrupted by A and is received by R who uses the
decoding algorithm of the RMT protocol to output a message
m, or output ⊥.
Definition 6: An RMT protocol between S and R is 1-
round δ-reliable message transmission (δ-RMT) protocol if R
correctly receives the message m with probability ≥ 1−δ, and
outputs ⊥ with probability ≤ δ. The receiver never outputs an
incorrect message:
Pr[R outputs ⊥] ≤ δ
The transmission efficiency is measured by the transmission
rate which is the ratio of the total number of bits transmitted
from S to R to the length of the message in bits. Protocols
whose transmission rate asymptotically matches the lower
bounds are called optimal. Optimal 1-round δ−RMT protocols
must have transmission rates O(1).
Computational efficiency is measured by the computational
complexity of the encoding and the decoding, as a function of
N . Efficient scheme needs polynomial (in N ) computation of
both encoding and decoding algorithm.
C. Message authentication codes
A message authentication code (MAC) is a cryptographic
primitive that allows a sender who shares a secret key with
the receiver to send an information block over a channel
that is tampered by an adversary, enabling the receiver to
verify the integrity of the received message. We follow the
terminology of [19] and refer to the information block as
source state, and to the authenticated message that is sent
over the channel as, the message. A message authentication
code consists of two algorithms (MAC;V er) that are used
for tag generation and verification, respectively. The sender of
a source state x computes an authentication tag, or simply
a tag, y = MAC(k;x), and forms the message (x, y) to be
sent over the channel. The receiver accepts the pair (x, y) if
V er((x, y), k)) = 1. Security of a 1-time MAC is by requiring,
Pr[(x′, y′), V er(k, (x′, y′)) = 1|(x, y), y = MAC(k, x)] ≤ ε
III. MODEL, DEFINITIONS AND BUILDING BLOCKS
We first introduce our model of randomized LV adversarial
channel, and define the decoding error for randomized LV
adversary codes. We then describe the construction of a new
message authentication code with provable security, that is used
in the construction of the LV adversary code.
A. Limited view adversary
An (N,M) randomized LV adversary code C of length N
with M codewords over Fq , consist of a probabilistic encoding
algorithm, Enc : M × U → C, from a message set M
of size M to a code book C. Here U is the randomness
used in the encoding. The encoding and decoding algorithms
are Enc(m, r) and Dec(y) ∈ {M∪ ⊥}, respectively. Let
Cm = {c : c = Enc(m, r), ∀r ∈ U}. To guarantee perfect de-
codability without error, we assume Cm ∩Cm′ = ∅, m 6= m′.
Let [N ] = {1, · · · , N}, and Sr = {i1, · · · , iρrN} ⊂ [N ] and
Sw = {j1, · · · , jρwN} ⊂ [N ] be two subsets of positions.
Definition 7: A (ρr, ρw) limited view adversary, or a
(ρr, ρw) LV adversary for short, has two capabilities: reading
and writing. For a codeword of length N , these capabilities are:
• Reading: Adversary reads a subset Sr of size ρrN ,
of the components of the sent codeword c and learns,
(ci1 , · · · , ciρrN ).
• Writing: Adversary adds (component wise and over Fq) to
the sent codeword, an error vector e with wt(e) = ρwN ,
whose non-zero components are on Sw. The corrupted
components of c in Sw are, (yj1 , · · · , yjρwN ).
The adversary is adaptive: that is the adversary first chooses
i1 to see, and based on the seen value ci1 , chooses i2 and so
on. That is to choose any member of Sr, the adversary uses
the knowledge of all the components that have been seen till
then. The adversary then adaptively chooses Sw, and the error
vector e.
B. Randomized limited view adversary code
By observing the values {ci1 , · · · , ciρrN}, the adversary
can determine a subset of possible sent codewords (those
that match the seen positions). Let C[ci1 , · · · , ciρrN ] denote
the set of codewords that have {ci1 , · · · , ciρrN } in positions
Sr = {i1, · · · , iρrN}.
1) Decoding error: Decoder uses bounded distance decod-
ing with radius ρwN : for a received vector y, it considers all
codewords that are in B(y, ρwN) and if it finds encodings of a
unique message, it outputs that message; Otherwise it outputs
⊥. The error vector e is of weight wH(e) ≤ ρwN and is chosen
by the adversary after reading {ci1 , · · · , ciρrN}. The adversary
can find the failure probability of the decoder for any error
vector e, and choose the “best” one; this is the e that results in
the highest failure probability for the decoder.
Definition 8: Consider an additive error e with wH(e) =
ρwN . The decoding error δe(C[ci1 , · · · , ciρrN ]) for a message
m and an error e if adversary chooses to read a Sr and see
{ci1 , · · · , ciρrN} in those positions is
δe(C[ci1 , · · · , ciρrN ]) = Pr[Enc(m, r) ∈ C[ci1 · · · ciρrN ]
∧Dec(Enc(m, r) + e) =⊥ | C[ci1 · · · ciρrN ]]
The decoding algorithm fails, that is Dec(Enc(m, r)+e) =⊥,
if and only if there exist c′ ∈ C \Cm and c′ ∈ B(c+ e, ρrN).
The decoding error for the decoder is,
δ = max
Sr
max
ci1 ,··· ,ciρrN
max
e
δe(C[ci1 , · · · , ciρrN ])
Definition 9: An (N,M, δ) randomized LV adversary code
with protection against (ρr, ρw) adversary, ensures that the
probability of the decoding failure defined as above, is no more
than δ.
C. MAC Construction
In the following we first give Construction I for a MAC,
and then in Section III-C2 give Construction II which is an
equivalent polynomial representation for it. This latter MAC
will be used in the construction of the LV adversary code in
Section IV-A. Construction I provides an intuitive understand-
ing of Construction II.
Both MACs are 2
qN
secure.
1) MAC Construction I: The MAC is defined over FqN and
works for any length message. The source state of the MAC is
x = (x1, · · · , xl), where l is any integer and l > 0. The MAC
key is r = (r1, · · · , rd, rd+1) where d is the smallest integer
that satisfies d(d+3)2 ≥ l. The message of MAC is (x, tag). The
tag generation is given by,
tag =MAC(x, r) =
∑
1≤m≤d
xmrm+
∑
1≤i≤j≤d
id+j− i(i−1)2 ≤l
x
id+j− i(i−1)2
rirj + rd+1 mod q
N
The MAC function consists of three types of terms. For a
message symbol xm with index m, one of the three types,
as defined below, is calculated. The final MAC is the sum of
all the calculated terms.
1) xmrm, for 1 ≤ m ≤ d;
2) xmrirj , for d+ 1 ≤ m ≤ l where m = id+ j − i(i−1)2 ,
and 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ d;
3) rd+1, which is independent of message symbols.
For d+ 1 ≤ m ≤ l, the algorithm works as follows.
1. Consider the message symbols md+1,md+2, · · ·ml as a
sequence;
2. Construct a key sequence using the product of a pair of
key symbols ri and rj as follows: start from the smallest
i = 1, j = 1; increase j by one from i to d; then increase
i by one and repeat to reach the highest values of the two
indexes.
3. Find the product of xm and the element of the key sequence
constructed above, that corresponds with position m.
It can be seen that for a given pair i and j, m will satisfy
m = id+ j − i(i−1)2 .
Lemma 2: The probability that a computationally unlimited
adversary can forge a message (x′, tag′) with x′ 6= x, that
passes the verification test is no more than 2
qN
.
We omit the security proof because of space and that it is
essentially the same as the proof of Construction II.
2) MAC Construction II: We introduce a MAC that can
be seen as a different representation of Construction I above,
that will be used in the construction of efficient randomized
LV adversary code. The MAC can be described by a set of
equations over Fq . The source state of the MAC is a vector of
length Nl over Fq ,
x =
[
x1,0, · · · , x1,N−1, · · · , xl,0, · · · , xl,N−1
]T
The key for the MAC is a vector of length Nd+ 3N − 2 over
Fq where d is the smallest integer satisfies d(d+3)2 ≥ l,
r = [r1,0, · · · , r1,N−1, rd,0 · · · , rd,N−1,
rd+1,0, · · · , rd+1,3N−3]T
We write the key in the form of an (3N−2)×(Nl+1) matrix:
R =
[
R1 | · · · | Rd | Rd+1 | · · · | Rl | Rl+1
]
where Rm is a matrix that, depending on the value of the index
m, can take the following forms. For 1 ≤ m ≤ d,
Rm =


rm,0 0 · · · 0
rm,1 rm,0 · · · 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
rm,N−1 rm,N−2 · · · rm,0
0 rm,N−1 · · · rm,1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 · · · rm,N−1
0 0 · · · 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 · · · 0


For d+ 1 ≤ m ≤ l,
Rm =


ri,j,0 0 · · · 0
ri,j,1 ri,j,0 · · · 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
ri,j,N−1 ri,j,N−2 · · · ri,j,0
ri,j,N ri,j,N−1 · · · ri,j,1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
ri,j,2N−1 ri,j,2N−2 · · · ri,N−1
0 ri,j,2N−1 · · · ri,j,N
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 · · · ri,j,2N−1


where m is written as a pair of integers i and j, similar
to the description of Construction I, and we have ri,j,k =∑
0≤a1,a2
a1+a2=k
ri,a1rj,a2 for 0 ≤ k ≤ 2N − 1.
Finally, Rl+1 = [rd+1,0, · · · , rd+1,3N−3]T .
The tag for a source state is a vector of length 3N − 2,
t = [t0, · · · , t3N−3]T .
A source state x is encoded to the message (x, t) using the
MAC algorithm,
MAC(x, r) =
∑
1≤m≤d
xjRj +
∑
d+1≤m≤l
xmRm +Rl+1
= [R1 | · · · | Rl | Rl+1]×


x1,0
.
.
.
x1,N−1
.
.
.
xl+1,0
.
.
.
xl+1,3N−3
1


=
[
t
] (2)
The verification algorithm V er(r, (x′, t′)) for a key r is by
calculating MAC(x′, r), and comparing it with the received
t′.
Lemma 3: The probability that a computationally unlimited
adversary can forge a message (x′, t′) with x′ 6= x, that passes
the verification is no more than 2
qN
.
Proof: Appendix B.
IV. CONSTRUCTION OF LV ADVERSARY CODE
In this section we describe the construction of an LV ad-
versary code that uses the MAC algorithm in Section III-C2
together with an FRS code with appropriately chosen parame-
ters.
A. (N, qNuR, δ) randomized limited view adversary code
We assume the adversary reads ρN positions and adds errors
to the same positions. Let N and R denote the code length
and information rate, respectively.
The LV adversary code is over Fuq . The sender S wishes to
send the message m = (m0, · · · ,mNuR−1),mi ∈ Fq , to the
receiver.
Randomized LV adversary code:
m = (m0, · · · ,mNuR−1)
↓
x = (m,0)
↓ ti = MAC(x, ri)
(x, t1, · · · , tN )
↓
r1 r2 r3 .......... rN
FRSEnc(x, t1 · · · tN )
The LV adversary code is constructed over Fuq where
u = u1 + u2. The FRS code is over Fu1q and the
randomness ri has length u2. We set the parameters of
MAC Construction II to be l = ⌈uR⌉ and d = ⌈√2u1⌉.
We have u2 = Nd + 3N − 2 = N⌈
√
2u1⌉ + 3N − 2 and
u = u1 +N⌈
√
2u1⌉+ 3N − 2.
Encoding algorithm performed by the sender S :
Step 1: Append vector {0} ∈ FN(l−uR)q to message
m = (m0, · · · ,mNuR−1), and form the vector
x = {m,0} of length Nl.
Step 2: Generate random keys ri,1 ≤ i ≤ N , for the MAC
Construction II. Each key is written as a (3N−2)×(Nl+1)
matrix,
Ri = [Ri,1 | · · · | Ri,l | Ri,d+1]
Step 3: Use MAC Construction II to generate tags ti =
MAC(x,Ri), i = 1, · · · , N .
The FRS code is of dimension k = Nl+N(3N− 2). The
message block for the FRS code is,
mFRS = (x, t1 · · · tN )
Step 4: Use the FRS encoding algorithm to encode mFRS
to the codeword cFRS = EncFRS(mFRS).
The ith component of c, the codeword of the limited view
adversary code, is obtained by appending the randomness
ri to cFRSi , the ith component of the FRS code.
ci = (c
FRS
i , ri)
Decoding algorithm performed by the receiver R :
Step 1: Receive a corrupted word y with the ith
component yi = (yFRSi , rˆi). Here yFRSi and rˆi are the
ith component of the FRS code and the randomness in
corrupted form, respectively.
Step 2: Use the FRS decoding algorithm to decode the
FRS codeword yFRS and obtain the system of linear
equations, 6.
Step 3: Generate N systems of linear equations, each
system obtained from the set of linear equations generated
from the FRS decoding algorithm and one MAC key ri.
The ith system of linear equation is of the form,
[
B0 B1 · · · Bi · · · BN
R′i 0 · · · −I · · · 0
]
×


x
t1
.
.
.
ti
.
.
.
tN


=
[ −a′
−Ri,d+1
]
(3)
The first Nl + N(3N − 2) equations are generated by
the FRS decoding algorithm of Eq. 6: the first Nl columns
of the matrix of coefficients of these equations form B0,
and for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , columns (Nl + (i − 1)(3N − 2)) to
(Nl + i(3N − 2) − 1) of this matrix specify Bi. Finally,
−a′ is the right hand side vector of Eq. 6. The last 3N−2
equations are from MAC Construction II using key ri,
with R′i = [Ri,1 | · · · | Ri,l], and I is identity matrix.
Step 4: Solves each of the N systems of linear equations.
Let xi denote, the first Nl components of a solution output
by the ith system of linear equation. The ith system of
linear equation is considered to have output output xi, if xi
is the unique output of this system. Otherwise R marks the
output of the ith system, as NULL. If there is a unique x
output by a set of the N−ρN systems of linear equations,
R outputs the first NuR components of that x as m.
Otherwise outputs ⊥.
B. Adversary’s reading and writing capability
Theorem 1: The (N, qRN , δ) randomized limited view ad-
versary code over Fuq above, can correctly decode if the
adversary reads and writes on the same set of size ρN of a
codeword.
ρ ≤ min(1
2
− 1
2N
,
v
v + 1
−
v
v + 1
uR+ 3N
N2 + u−N(√N2 + 2u+ 3)− v )
Proof: Firstly, ρ < 1/2: If the adversary can read and
write on half of the components of a codeword c, they can
choose any other codeword c′ and add appropriate error vector
to replace components of c on the controlled positions to obtain
y which is equal to c′ on the controlled components, and equal
to c on the remaining ones. The decoder can not decode y and
fail.
Secondly, we find a bound on ρ when ρ < 12 . The code
dimension for the FRS code is k = NuR, and each component
is in Fuq . Note that only the FRS code, which is over Fu1q ,
contains the message information. Hence, k = Nu1R1. Let
RFRS be the information rate of the FRS code. The decoding
algorithm of LV adversary code need to satisfy the decoding
condition of FRS code. According to Lemma 1, the FRS code
with length N and information rate RFRS can decode ρN
adversary errors if satisfying the condition:
N − ρN ≥ N( 1
v + 1
+
v
v + 1
u1RFRS
u1 − v + 1) (4)
The equation is satisfied if,
N − ρN ≥ N
v + 1
+
v
v + 1
(N(u1R1 + 1) +N(3N − 2))
u1 − v + 1
The maximum error that the adversary can add is,
ρ ≤ v
v + 1
− v
v + 1
(u1R1 + 3N − 1)
u1 − v + 1
The LV adversary code is over Fuq and u = u1+⌈
√
2u1⌉N+
3N − 2. So we have,
u1 ≥ N2 + u− 3N + 1−N
√
N2 + 2u− 2(3N − 1)
The decoding condition of FRS code is satisfied if the following
inequality is met:
ρ ≤ v
v + 1
− v
v + 1
×
uR+ 3N − 1
N2 + u− 3N + 2−N√N2 + 2u− 2(3N − 1)− v + 1
This is equivalent to,
ρ ≤ v
v + 1
− v
v + 1
uR+ 3N
N2 + u−N(√N2 + 2u− 3)− v
C. Decoding error
The adversary reads ρN components of a corrupted code-
word and adds errors to the same positions using the knowledge
of the components that are read.
Lemma 4: If the adversary does not choose the ith position
for read and write, the probability that the ith system of linear
equations (Eqs. 3) does not produce the unique solution which
contains the correct message m is at most 2
qN−v+1
. This is
equivalent to,
Pr[dH(c
′FRS , yFRS) ≤ ρN, t′i = MAC(x′, ri)|C[ci1 · · · ciρN ]]
≤ 2
qN−v+1
with c′FRS = EncFRS(m′FRS) and m′FRS = (x′, t′1 · · · t′N )
and (x′ 6= x).
Proof: Firstly, because the correct message is always
contained in the decoded list of the FRS decoding algorithm,
the correct x = {m,0} will be in the solution space of the
system of linear Eq. 3. Also because the key ri has not been
modified, the solution will be contained in the solution space
of the equations generated by the MAC. Hence the solution
space of the Eqs. 3 must contain the correct message m.
Secondly, a solution x′, where x′ 6= x, of the system of
linear Eqs. 6 resulting from the FRS decoding algorithm, with
probability at most 2
qN
will be a solution of the system of linear
Eqs. 3. Now assume x′ 6= x is a solution of Eqs. 3. This means
that it must satisfy the equations generated by MAC:
[
R′i − I
] ×
[
x′
t′i
]
=
[−Ri,v+2] (5)
Using lemma 3, the probability that MAC(x′, ri) = t′i is at
most 2
qN
.
Finally, the system of linear equations Eq. 6 generated by the
decoding algorithm of the FRS code produces a list of at most
qv−1 solutions, {c′FRS : dH(c′FRS , yFRS) ≤ ρN}, where
each codeword represents a message of the form m′FRS =
(x′, t′1 · · · t′N ). The first Nl components of each solution gives
one solution for x′. By union the probability of the solutions
x′ 6= x of Eqs. 6 that are also the solution of Eqs. 5, the Eqs.
3 has more than one solution with probability no more than
2qv−1
qN
.
The adversary has no information of ri. After observ-
ing {ci1 , · · · , ciρn}, the probabilty that there exist {c′FRS :
dH(c
′FRS , yFRS) ≤ ρN} and the message passing MAC
verification MAC(x′, ri) = t′i is still equal to 2qN−v+1 .
Theorem 2: The decoding error of the (N, qRN , δ) random-
ized limited view adversary code is at most δ ≤ 2N
qN−v+1
.
Proof: Let y = Enc(m, r)+e be the corrupted word, and
I3 = Sr = Sw denote the positions that are read and modified
by the adversary. For a codeword c′ = (c′FRS , r′1, · · · , r′N )
with c′FRS = EncFRS(m′FRS) and m′FRS = (x′, t′1 · · · t′N )
and x′ 6= x, let Ic′1 = {i : c′i = yi} and Ic
′
2 = {i :
MAC(x′, r′i) = t
′
i}.
According to definition 8, the probability of decoding failure
for an encoding of a message m that satisfies the observation
set (ci1 · · · ciρN ) is,
Pr[B(Enc(m, r) + e, ρN) ∩ {C \ Cm} 6= ∅| C[ci1 · · · ciρN ]]
This is the probability that for a codeword c′ ∈ C \ Cm,
there exists two subsets Ic′1 and Ic
′
2 such that, |Ic
′
1 | ≥ N −ρN ,
|Ic′2 | = N and |Ic
′
1 ∩ Ic
′
2 | ≥ N − ρN . The latter two conditions
imply |Ic′1 ∩ Ic
′
2 | ≥ ρN + 1 if ρ < 12 , which can be written as,
|{[N ] \ I3} ∩ Ic′1 ∩ Ic
′
2 | = 1.
Note that |Ic′1 | ≥ N − ρN implies dH(c′FRS , yFRS) ≤ ρN ,
and |{[N ] \ I3} ∩ Ic′1 ∩ Ic
′
2 | = 1 implies existence of ic
′
such
that ic′ ∈ {Ic′1 ∩ Ic
′
2 } and ic
′ ∈ [N ] \ I3.
This means that we have,
Pr[B(Enc(m, r) + e, ρN) ∩ {C \ Cm} 6= ∅| C[ci1 · · · ciρN ]]
≤Pr[(ic′ ∈ [N ] \ I3), (ic
′ ∈ {Ic′1 ∩ Ic
′
2 }),
(dH(c
′FRS , yFRS) ≤ ρN) | C[ci1 · · · ciρN ]]
≤(N − ρN) Pr[(ic′ /∈ I3), (ic
′ ∈ {Ic′1 ∩ Ic
′
2 }),
(dH(c
′FRS , yFRS) ≤ ρN) | C[ci1 · · · ciρN ]]
=(N − ρN) Pr[(ic′ /∈ I3), (MAC(x′, ri) = t′i),
(dH(c
′FRS , yFRS) ≤ ρN) | C[ci1 · · · ciρN ]]
≤ 2N
qN−v+1
The last inequality is correct because of lemma 4.
If we choose v = 1
ε
, u = 2
ε4
+ 2N
ε2
where ε > 0 is a small
value, the decoding capability ρ can be approximated is ρ =
min(12− 12N , 1−(1+Nε2)R−Nε4−N2ε6), and the decoding
error will be given by δ ≤ q 1ε−N . The field size q can be
chosen as the smallest prime q > Nu. The encoding algorithm
is polynomial in N . For decoding algorithm, the computational
complexity of solving any ith system of linear equation Eqs.
3 is O(((uN +N2) log q)2) and there are N systems of linear
equations. So the computational time of decoding algorithm is
polynomial in O(N((uN +N2) log q)2).
Corollary 1: Assume the adversary is allowed to read (at
most) ρ fraction of a codeword and can write on the same set.
The (N, qRN , δ) randomized LV adversary code over F
2
ε4
+ 2N
ε2
q
with,
ρ ≤ min
(
1
2
− 1
2N
, 1− (1 +Nε2)R −Nε4 −N2ε6
)
can correctly decode the errors and the decoding error δ → 0
if N →∞. The computational time is polynomial in N .
The construction above can be immediately used to construct
an optimal 1-round δ-RMT, by using the encoding algorithm of
the LV adversary code with appropriate length, to construct a
codeword for the message, and simply send the ith component
of the codeword on path i in the RMT setting. The decoding
error in LV adversary codes is equivalent to the strongest
definition of reliability in RMT scenario where the adversary
can choose the message, and so δ in RMT will be at most equal
to the decoder failure in LV adversary codes. The optimality
follows from the constant (non-zero) rate of the LV adversary
code.
Corollary 2: The construction of the randomized LV adver-
sary code give an optimal 1-round δ-RMT, where δ is the same
as the decoding error in LV adversary codes.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We introduced randomized limited view adversary codes and
gave an efficient construction that wiith appropriate choice of
parameters, can correct close to N/2 errors and will have infor-
mation rate close to 1/2. Although in general the observation
and corruption sets can be different, in our construction we
assumed they are the same. Giving a construction without this
assumption will be our future work. In our construction the
field size is a function of N and so small δ can be obtained
for large field sizes. Finding good LV adversary codes with fix
field size, and/or information rate approaching 1 − ρ − ε are
open problems.
Randomized codes do not have the restrictions of deter-
ministic codes on their parameters and can achieve much
better performance (higher ρr and ρw for fixed R). Finding
general bounds and relationship among the information rate
R, observation ρr and corruption ρw ratios, and finding the
information capacity of LV adversary codes remain important
research questions.
Our work showed that LV adversary codes provide a more
refined way of modelling RMT scenarios allowing to cater for
the information rate of these protocols. Extending definition
of LV adversary codes to interactive scenarios will be an
interesting open question.
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APPENDIX
A. Decoding algorithm of FRS code
Linear algebraic list decoding [9] has two main steps: inter-
polation and message finding as outlined below.
• Find a polynomial, Q(X,Y1, · · · , Yv) = A0(X) +
A1(X)Y1 + · · · + Av(X)Yv, over Fq such that
deg(Ai(X)) ≤ D, for i = 1 · · · v, and deg(A0(X)) ≤
D + k − 1, satisfying Q(αi, yi1 , yi2 , · · · , yiv) = 0 for
1 ≤ i ≤ n0, where n0 = (u1 − v + 1)N .
• Find all polynomials f(X) ∈ Fq[X ] of degree at most k−
1, with coefficients f0, f1 · · · fk−1, that satisfy, A0(X) +
A1(X)f(X)+A2(X)f(γX)+ · · ·+Av(X)f(γv−1X) =
0, by solving linear equation system.
The two above requirements are satisfied if f ∈ Fq[X ] is a
polynomial of degree at most k − 1 whose FRS encoding (Eq
1) agrees with the received word y in at least T components:
T > N(
1
v + 1
+
v
v + 1
u1R
u1 − v + 1)
This means we need to find all polynomials f(X) ∈ Fq[X ]
of degree at most k−1, with coefficients f0, f1, · · · , fk−1, that
satisfy,
A0(X) +A1(X)f(X) +A2(X)f(γX) + · · ·+
Av(X)f(γ
v−1X) = 0
Let us denote Ai(X) =
∑D+k−1
j=0 ai,jX
j for 0 ≤ i ≤ v.
(ai,j = 0 when i ≥ 1 and j ≥ D). Define the polynomials,


B0(X) = a1,0 + a2,0X + a3,0X
2 + · · ·+ av,0Xv−1
.
.
.
Bk−1(X) = a1,k−1 + a2,k−1X + a3,k−1X
2 + · · ·+
av,k−1X
v−1
We examine the condition that the coefficients of X i of the
polynomial Q(X) = A0(X)+A1(X)f(X)+A2(X)f(γX)+
· · ·+Av(X)f(γv−1X) = 0 equals 0, for i = 0 · · · k − 1. This
is equivalent to the following system of linear equations for
f0 · · · fk−1.


B0(γ
0) 0 0 · · · 0
B1(γ
0) B0(γ
1) 0 · · · 0
B2(γ
0) B1(γ
1) B0(γ
2) · · · 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Bk−1(γ
0) Bk−2(γ
1) Bk−3(γ
2) · · · B0(γk−1)


×


f0
f1
f2
.
.
.
fk−1


=


−a0,0
−a0,1
−a0,2
.
.
.
−a0,k−1


(6)
The rank of the matrix of Eqs. 6 is at least k − v + 1 because
there are at most v − 1 solutions of equation B0(X) = 0 so
at most v − 1 of γi that makes B0(γi) = 0. The dimension of
solution space is at most v − 1 because the rank of matrix of
Eqs. 6 is at least k−v+1. So there are at most qv−1 solutions
to Eqs. 6 and this determines the size of the list which is equal
to qv−1.
B. Proof of lemma 3
Proof: We need to find the following probability:
Pr[(MAC(x′, r) = t′)|(MAC(x, r) = t)]
The MAC function given by Eqs. 2, is equivalent to the
MAC of the polynomial form in Eq. 7. For 0 ≤ i ≤ 3N − 3,
the coefficients of X i in both sides of equation 7 form the same
equation as the ith equation in the system of linear equations
2.
t(X) = MAC(x, r) =
∑
1≤m≤d
xm(X)rm(X)+
∑
d+1≤m≤l
m=id+j− i(i−1)2
xm(X)ri(X)rj(X) + rd+1(X) mod q
(7)
where each polynomial is given below
xm(X) = xm,0 + · · ·+ xm,N−1XN−1 mod q, 1 ≤ i ≤ l
rm(X) = rm,0 + · · ·+ rm,N−1XN−1 mod q, 1 ≤ m ≤ d
rm(X) = ri,j,0 + · · ·+ ri,j,2N−2X2N−2 =
ri(X)rj(X) mod q, d+ 1 ≤ m ≤ l, m = id+ j − i(i− 1)
2
rd+1(X) = rd+1,0 + · · ·+ rd+1,3N−3X3N−3 mod q
Finally, t(X) = t0 + · · ·+ t3N−3X3N−3 mod q.
So if we can prove that the adversary’s forging capability to
the MAC in the form of Eq. 7 is no more than ε, then the the
adversary’s forging capability to MAC construction II (Eqs. 2)
is also no more than ε.
Next we prove the adversary forging capability to MAC
in the form of Eq. 7 is no more than 2
qN
. Assume the
adversary forges a message (x′, t′) with x′ 6= x, that passes
the verification. We write the MAC in polynomial form.
t′(X) = MAC(x′, r) =
∑
1≤m≤d
x′m(X)rm(X)+
∑
d+1≤m≤l
m=id+j− i(i−1)2
x′m(X)ri(X)rj(X) + rd+1(X) mod q
(8)
By subtracting the two equations we will have,∑
d+1≤m≤l
m=id+j− i(i−1)2
∆xm(X)ri(X)rj(X)+
∑
1≤m≤d
∆xm(X)rm(X) = ∆t(X) mod q
The above equation has at most 2qN(d−1) solutions for
(r1(X), · · · , rd(X)). This means that there are at most
2qN(d−1) keys r that satisfy MAC(x, r) = t, and
MAC(x′, r) = t′. However, there are qNd possible values for
r satisfying MAC(x, r) = t. So the success probability of the
forgery is,
Pr[(MAC(x′, r) = t′)|(MAC(x, r) = t)]
=
2qN(d−1)
qNd
=
2
qN
